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??? ????????? ???? ????????????
This is an essay in meta-personal identity. Just as, in ethics, we 
distinguish between applied ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics, so 
we can make similar distinctions in the field of personal identity:
Applied personal identity: did this particular person who just entered this 
particular teletransporter just die, or does she continue to exist, over at the 
exit end of the teletransporter?
Personal identity: Is it just psychological continuity and connectedness that 
matters for persistence of persons, or is it just physical continuity, or is it 
some combination thereof, or is it persistence of souls, or is it something 
else?
Meta-personal identity: Is there an objective fact of the matter about whether 
a person does or does not persist, or is it somehow subjective or relative or 
conventional? If there are objective facts about persistence of persons, what 
(if anything) grounds those facts? If there are no such objective facts, how 
should we understand everyday utterances that seem to make presuppositions 
about personal identity (as in: “Fred went home, but he’ll be back”)?
“Meta-personal identity” doesn’t roll off the tongue, alas, so I’ll call this 
“metaidentity” for short. We have to remember, though, that we’re not 
talking about the standard sort of identity (as in: Superman is Clark 
Kent). Instead, we’re talking about personal identity, which (by my lights, 
at least) isn’t really about identity at all. What personal identity is about 
is persistence conditions: under what conditions does this person survive, 
and hence persist through time, and under what conditions does this 
person cease to exist, as a person? 
Suppose that Sally undergoes a standard personal identity 
thought-experiment: brain transplant, teletransportation, memory erasure, 
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ship of Theseus with neurons, what have you. Call “old Sally” the person 
before she undergoes the experiment, and “new Sally” the person who 
emerges. (Later we’ll take up cases where more than one person 
emerges.) Here are two types of questions we can ask:
(1) Is new Sally the same person as old Sally? In other words, did Sally 
survive the experiment, or did she cease to exist, as a person?
(2) Suppose that old Sally did something morally wrong just before the 
experiment. Is new Sally morally responsible for what old Sally did? (Or, 
suppose old Sally did something morally right just before the experiment; is 
new Sally morally commendable?)
Part of the point of this paper is to argue that there is a close connection 
between these two questions. But which way does the connection go? 
One could maintain that the personal identity question is the fundamental 
one, and that the answer to that question will guide us in attributing 
moral responsibility. This is the dominant view in the literature. Here for 
example, is David Shoemaker endorsing that view: 
In order to attribute moral responsibility to someone for an act, we must be 
able to determine that that person is the same person as the person who 
performed the act. ??What is needed first is a plausible metaphysical account 
of persons and personal identity to which an ethical theory might then 
conform and apply. (Shoemaker 1999, 183)
For Shoemaker, the metaphysical account of personal identity is, 
conceptually, what comes first?the personal identity facts then get 
inputted into the ethical theory. 
On the other hand, one could maintain that the moral responsibility 
question is the fundamental one, and the answer to that question grounds 
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the facts about personal identity (where the grounding relation is 
understood in the now-standard way elucidated by for example Gideon 
Rosen (2010)). This is the view I hold; this is what I’ll be arguing for 
in this paper.
??? ?????? ????????????? ???? ??? ????????
Let’s start with three big assumptions. These are assumptions that I 
believe, but I won’t argue for them here. In this section I’ll give my 
argument for the claim that morality grounds personal identity using these 
assumptions, and later I’ll talk about how my position would change 
when these assumptions are dropped. 
The first assumption is that there are objective moral truths, 
independent of what we believe about morality. Though it doesn’t really 
matter for the purposes of this paper, the sort of moral realism I endorse 
is non-natural and non-theistic?the moral truths are not reducible to 
natural facts and properties, and are not true as a result of the existence 
(and perhaps choices) of some divine being. Instead, moral truths have 
the status of other objective truths that are (contentiously) non-natural: 
modal truths, mathematical truths, and logical truths. This sort of moral 
realism has been argued for well by for example Michael Huemer (2005) 
and Erik Wielenberg (2009). 
The second and third assumptions naturally go together. The second 
assumption is that the perdurance theory of persistence is true: objects 
persist by having temporal parts. A persisting object (in standard 
spacetime, at least) is a four-dimensional spacetime worm, and this 
four-dimensional object is composed of instantaneous temporal parts, 
where each instantaneous temporal part is the object at a particular time 
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(modulo time travel stories). (Some philosophers distinguish between the 
“stage view” and the “worm view”, where the stage view holds that a 
person is a person-stage, existing at a particular time, while the worm 
view holds that a person is the whole temporally extended spacetime 
worm. I don’t think there’s a metaphysical difference between these two 
views; sometimes, we refer to person-stages (“Jill is sitting”), while other 
times, we refer to the whole worm (“Jack had a wonderful life”).)
The third assumption is that the doctrine of unrestricted mereological 
composition is true. For every collection of objects, there is a whole that 
is composed of those objects as parts. So, for example, there is the 
24-hour-long four-dimensional spacetime worm of Obama on July 1 
2011, which can be combined with the 24-hour-long four-dimensional 
spacetime worm of Cheney on January 1 2012, to form a particular 
object, Obacheny, spread in space and time in a complex, disjoint way. 
Given the latter two assumptions, one might think that there is no 
interesting debate about personal identity to be had. When faced with a 
personal identity thought experiment, there is an object that exists both 
before and after the experiment (the mereological sum of old Sally and 
new Sally, for example), and there is an object that ceases to exist at the 
time of the experiment (old Sally, for example), and there are an infinite 
number of other objects (the mereological sum of old Sally, the first two 
minutes of new Sally, and Obacheny, for example). All these objects 
exist, according to the doctrine of unrestricted mereological composition, 
and so it’s prima facie unclear how to answer the question of whether 
Sally persists through the experiment?which of the infinite number of 
mereological sums of objects are we talking about when we talk about 
Sally? I maintain that there is a definite answer, and the objective moral 
facts determine what the definite answer is. 
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I’ll give my whole argument now, and then provide some elaboration. 
The first step in my argument is to point out that we’re talking about 
personal identity, so we’re talking about the persistence of persons. 
Suppose that John goes into a permanent vegetative state. John persists 
as a biological organism, but John (arguably) ceases to exist as a person. 
Suppose that John later dies and is buried. We make everyday utterances 
like “John is buried here”, and I (perhaps controversially) believe that 
such utterances are literally true (on a certain interpretation, at least). 
John does not persist as a person, and does not persist as a biological 
organism, but does persist as a mereological sum of particles that 
composed the biological organism pre-death. Similarly, “we are stardust” 
is also a literally true claim, given a certain interpretation. There are of 
course ways of interpreting the claim such that it comes out false, but a 
charitable interpretation picks up on the fact that the utterer is talking, not 
about the persistence of persons, or of biological organisms, but the 
persistence of constituting atoms. Since these atoms were formed by 
fusion reactions in stars, then there’s a sense in which it’s true that our 
current temporal parts are mereological sums of stardust. 
But even if you disagree with that particular controversial claim, my 
overall point is that, when focusing on the question of personal identity, 
we are interested in the persistence conditions for persons, not biological 
organisms or atoms. But what is a person?
This brings me to the second step in my argument: I hold that the 
concept of a person is a moral concept. First, a preliminary point: we all 
agree that persons have moral worth, but some non-persons have moral 
worth as well?it’s wrong to torture a cow, even though a cow is not a 
person. But my main point is that persons, in addition to having moral 
worth, are (at least rudimentary) moral agents. Persons are morally 
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responsible for the bad things they do, and morally commendable for the 
good things they do, and this is part of what is involved in being a person
?it is to be the sort of agent to whom moral responsibility and 
commendability is to be attributed. 
Without moral facts, it’s unclear what does ground personal identity 
facts. Consider a full specification of what happens in some personal 
identity thought-experiment. We can specify where every particle goes, 
we can specify what the psychological traits are of every temporal part 
of persons involved, and we can specify how souls are persisting, if 
indeed souls exist. Given all these facts, which mereological sums of 
temporal parts constitute a single persisting person? One still has to know 
(for example) that the persistence of consciousness is what establishes the 
persistence of a person (as for example Locke thought), or that the 
persistence of the soul establishes the persistence of the person (Locke 
famously thought otherwise). But what grounds those facts? 
Now, it could just be a matter of our individual or communal practices, 
or our arbitrary semantic conventions, that “person” refers to a certain 
type of entity. I’ll consider (and reject) those lines of thought in the next 
section. But my position is that the fact that some temporal parts of 
entities have objective moral responsibility relations to other temporal 
parts enables us to pick out a certain privileged mereological sum of 
temporal parts, and that is the entity that should be thought of as a 
persisting person. 
That, in a nutshell, is my argument. But before taking up the 
alternative lines of thought in the next section, there are four points I 
want to make. 
First, I’ve said that I’m interested in the moral responsibility relation, 
and that this grounds personal identity. Specifically, what I’m interested 
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in is the ancestral of the moral responsibility relation. Just as there are 
legal statues of limitations, so there may well be moral ones. 
Eighty-year-old Sarah is not morally responsible for three-year-old 
Sarah’s gum-stealing, but that is not a problem, on my view. As long as 
temporal part #n of Sarah is morally responsible for something that 
temporal part #n?1 did, and temporal part #n?1 of Sarah is morally 
responsible for something that temporal part #n?2 did, and so on, then 
all these temporal parts are parts of the same person. 
Here’s my second point. I take it that one can be morally responsible, 
not just for bad things one does, but for good things as well. The 
personal identity relation isn’t just grounded in the morally wrong things 
people do. Even if a person never did anything morally wrong, the person 
is nevertheless morally commendable for good things she did in the 
immediate past, and that chain of moral commendability is enough to 
ground personal identity. One might ask: what if a person has a morally 
neutral day, such that she doesn’t do anything morally bad or good?how 
can my view make sense of her continuance as a person throughout that 
day? I hold that persons never have morally neutral days; they are 
constantly doing morally good (or bad) things. The reason is that one is 
(at least minimally) morally commendable for omitting to do bad actions. 
So, a temporal part of a person that sits quietly has omitted from kicking 
anyone in the shin, and hence immediately subsequent temporal parts of 
the person are (at least minimally) morally commendable for that 
omission. 
My third point is that there’s an epistemological issue lurking in this 
whole discussion, which I want to acknowledge just to set aside. How is 
it that we can know whether a person persists through time? In other 
words, how can we know the answer to these moral questions? 
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I don’t have any special insight to offer regarding how to answer these 
questions. In many situations, the personal identity facts are just obvious 
to us: it’s obvious that the temporal part of Obama who got elected 
president in 2008 is part of the same person as the temporal part of 
Obama who got reelected in 2012. (And it’s also the case, once one 
thinks about it, that these obvious-seeming claims could be false, due to 
skeptical worries. Perhaps Obama was abducted by aliens in 2010, and 
was replaced by a qualitative duplicate.) Similarly, some moral facts are 
just obvious to us (barring philosophical worries about the status of moral 
truths, an issue I’ll come back to below). So in some cases, it’s obvious 
that a person persists, just as it’s obvious that a person is morally 
responsible for something she did. 
But there are other cases where it’s not at all obvious whether a person 
persists, just as it’s not at all obvious that a current temporal part of a 
person is morally responsible for something that a previous temporal part 
of a person did. In these situations, there’s nothing more we can do than 
to use our standard methods: we do careful philosophical reasoning, we 
try to reflect in a rational, unbiased way regarding how things morally 
seem to us, and so on. My point is that there is an objective fact of the 
matter about whether a temporal part of a person is morally responsible 
for something that another temporal part did, and that’s enough to 
metaphysically establish whether those temporal parts are parts of the 
same person, even in situations where it’s epistemically hard for us to 
figure out which moral facts, and hence which personal identity facts, 
hold. 
My fourth and final point addresses the question: to what extent is my 
position, that morality grounds personal identity, original? Well, I see 
foreshadowing in Locke, but my reading of Locke is controversial. (I 
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have a lot to say about different ways of interpreting Locke on 
metaidentity, and how my theory of metaidentity relates, but that is best 
saved for another paper.) The only philosophical work I’ve found that 
comes somewhat close to my view is a paper by Eric Wiland (2000). 
Wiland argues that our theory of moral responsibility should influence 
our theory of personal identity; to that extent we are in agreement. But 
the details of his view, and his corresponding argument, are quite 
different. For example, he gives a partial characterization of the personal 
identity relation, by giving two necessary criteria for whether a person 
persists. One is that, for Y to be the same person as X, Y must be bodily 
continuous with X. I wouldn’t want to build bodily continuity in as a 
necessary criterion (though it may end up being true, because of the 
objective moral facts being what they are). The other necessary criterion 
that he gives for Y to be the same person as X is that “Y is 
quasi-responsible for some action of X’s” (2000, 84). Unfortunately, 
Wiland does not give a precise definition of quasi-responsibility, and his 
discussion introducing the concept leaves me nonplussed. 
??? ???????????????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ?? ??????
I maintain that facts about persistence of persons are grounded in 
objective moral facts. But a contrasting popular view in the metaidentity 
literature is conventionalism: facts about persistence of persons just hold 
as a result of decisions that are made by an individual or a community. 
Consider, for example, David Braddon-Mitchell and Caroline West’s 
endorsement of conventionalism:
To survive, on our understanding, is to preserve whatever property a person’s 
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(or perhaps community’s) person-directed practices are organized around. 
(Braddon-Mitchell and West 2001, 61)
For conventionalists, whether a person persists depends on what 
person-directed practices are followed by a person (or the community the 
person is a part of). So whether, for example, you survive 
teletransportation depends on whether you (or your community) holds 
funerals for people who enter teletransportation machines, or treats such 
machines as a normal mode of transportation.
I believe that conventionalism holds for everyday created objects, like 
ships. The question of whether a ship persists is, indeed, purely grounded 
in our practices that reveal what it takes to be a persisting ship. 
But are persons relevantly like ships? I maintain that conventionalism 
for persons is a highly implausible position, precisely because we do not 
take facts about our survival to depend on what practices we choose to 
adopt. Facts about our survival are, intuitively at least, objective facts. A 
virtue of my view is that it can accommodate that. Given that the concept 
of a person is a moral concept, and that there are objective moral truths, 
then I maintain that the most plausible metaphysical view is that there are 
objective facts of the matter about whether a person persists, and whether 
a person persists is determined by the objective moral facts. 
To further develop my point that the concept of a person is a moral 
concept, let’s bring in a distinction that Matti Eklund makes in his 
underappreciated 2004 paper on personal identity. Eklund distinguishes 
between the “moral question” and the “semantic question” of personal 
identity. The moral question is: 
what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and 
ascriptions of responsibility around? (Eklund 2004, 489)
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The semantic question is:
what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of? (Eklund 2004, 489)
Regarding the moral question, Eklund recognizes that, in principle, the 
entities we should focus our prudential concerns around could be different 
from the entities we should focus our ascriptions of responsibility around. 
I maintain that ascriptions of responsibility are the focus of personal 
identity, and these ascriptions of responsibility should track the objective 
moral truths. Our prudential concerns have no such objective focus. (For 
example, I could be more prudentially concerned about my friend than 
myself when I risk my life to save her, and in choosing to be prudentially 
concerned in that way, I could be doing so in such a way that I don’t 
violate any objective dictates of prudence.) Thus, the aspect of Eklund’s 
moral question that I’m most interested in is: 
what is the nature of the entities we should focus our ascriptions of 
responsibility around?
Since we would want our ascriptions of responsibility to track the 
objective moral truths about responsibility, this question has the desired 
focus, linking the concept of a person to the objective moral truths.
But what about the semantic question?how is it that we actually use 
the concept ‘person’? Eklund argues that it’s not clear whether the 
answers to the moral question and the semantic question are the same. 
But even if they aren’t the same, Eklund points out that the semantic 
question ends up looking rather unimportant. His paper ends with the 
following:
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Suppose we have answered the moral question: we have figured out what 
person-like entities (if any) we should structure our ?? ascriptions of 
responsibility around. ??Still, we have not yet answered the semantic 
question: in order to do so we must take a close look at what our conception 
of persons is. However, how important is what is missing? ??All we would 
not know is which entities happen to be picked out by a particular concept 
of ours. The significance of this question seems to pale in comparison to the 
others. (Eklund 2004, 507-8)
I agree with Eklund that, if the moral question potentially has a different 
answer than the semantic question, then the moral question is the 
important one. In fact, the semantic question looks so unimportant when 
divorced from the moral question that I maintain that it is a mistake to 
so divorce it. Of course, different people understand a concept like 
‘person’ in different ways, and there is debate about what exactly the 
concept amounts to. But a way to help resolve this debate is to make 
clear that what’s implicit in our concept of a person are attributions of 
moral responsibility, and hence, the answer to the semantic question is 
the answer to the moral question.
That concludes my discussion of the semantic question and the moral 
question of personal identity. But there’s one more thing I want to say 
about Eklund. Eklund argues that our concept of a person is 
indeterminate, because “our conception of what persons are is not such 
as to decide what to say with respect to some of the problem cases 
discussed in the literature” (Eklund 2004, 490). I would argue instead that 
the apparent indeterminacy arises, not because we don’t have a full 
account of the concept of a person, but because we don’t have 
agreed-upon answers to some of the problematic moral responsibility 
questions that can be asked in the context of a personal identity problem 
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case. The concept of a person tracks moral responsibility; it’s because 
there is no agreement on whether, for example, new Sally emerging from 
the teletransporter is morally responsible for something that old Sally did 
that one might mistakenly think there is indeterminacy in the concept of 
a person. 
I have one final point to make about the concept of a person, before 
moving on. There are various definitions of the concept of a person given 
in the literature (in the context of the abortion debate, for example); how 
does my moral-responsibility-based conception of a person relate to those 
definitions? Consider, for example, Michael Tooley’s account:
Something is a person if and only if it is a continuing subject of experiences 
and other mental states that can envisage a future for itself and that can have 
desires about its own future states. (Tooley 1979, 91)
Definitions like this are compatible with my account of persons; they 
provide an answer to the moral question “what is the nature of the 
entities we should focus our ascriptions of responsibility around?” Based 
on Tooley’s definition, the answer would be:
The entities we should focus our ascriptions of responsibility around are the 
continuing subjects of experiences and other mental states that can envisage 
futures for themselves and that can have desires about their own future states.
Given that there are objective moral truths, and that our ascriptions of 
responsibility should track the objective moral truths, there is an objective 
fact of the matter regarding whether this answer is the right one. If the 
objective moral ascriptions of responsibility apply to all and only the 
continuing subjects of experiences and other mental states that can 
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envisage futures for themselves and that can have desires about their own 
future states, then Tooley’s account would be a correct account of the 
concept of a person. Thus, an account of personhood like Tooley’s is not 
incompatible with mine; we’re just engaging in different levels of 
analysis.
??? ????????? ???? ???????????
My argument above was based on three assumptions; let’s now consider 
what happens if we drop the assumptions. I’ll start with the first 
assumption, that there are objective moral truths. There are three standard 
moral anti-realist positions one could endorse, relativism, nihilism, and 
non-cognitivism; I’ll talk about how my metaidentity position would fare 
on each one.
According to moral relativism, moral facts are relative to an individual, 
or community (or something along those lines). Given my position that 
the moral facts establish the personal identity facts, it would follow that 
personal identity facts are similarly relative to an individual or 
community?the conventionalist position discussed above. Those who are 
inclined toward moral relativism may well be satisfied with this 
corresponding conventionalism in personal identity situations. 
Metaidentity conventionalism is typically argued for without bringing in 
moral relativism; I’ve presented a new line of argument for metaidentity 
conventionalism that moral relativists could give. 
According to moral nihilism, all positive moral claims are false 
(because they are attributing moral properties, and moral properties don’t 
exist). If we take this view that there are no positive moral facts, and 
apply it to my position that morality grounds personal identity, then we 
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get the view that there are no positive personal identity facts. The claim 
that Sally survives the teletransporter is false?and indeed, all claims that 
a person persists are false.
According to non-cognitivism, moral utterances don’t have 
truth-conditions?they are, for example, like expressions of approval or 
disapproval, or expressions of emotion. One way to apply that to personal 
identity is as follows. Suppose that Fred utters: “Sally survives the 
teletransporter”. This is Fred expressing his desire to treat new Sally as 
if she is the same person as old Sally. Fred could be an enlightened 
non-cognitivist, and endorse the connection between morality and 
personal identity, and hence Fred could realize that there is no fact of the 
matter regarding whether Sally survives. In uttering “Sally survives”, Fred 
is simply expressing his desire to treat new Sally the same sort of way 
he treated old Sally. (For example, if Fred was married to old Sally when 
she entered the teletransporter, he is expressing his desire to continue to 
treat new Sally as his partner.) 
To sum up: because of the link I’m endorsing between morality and 
personal identity, the different metaethical positions correspond to 
different metaidentity positions. All these metaidentity positions are prima 
facie live options, though my preferred one is the one that is based on 
moral realism.
Let’s now turn to the second and third assumptions: that the perdurance 
theory of persistence is true, and that the doctrine of unrestricted 
mereological composition is true. Since these two are linked, let’s drop 
them together: suppose that the endurance theory of persistence is true 
(an object is wholly present at every time that it exists), and that 
collections of objects don’t always compose a whole. 
The most radical way to give up unrestricted mereological composition 
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is to be a mereological nihilist. In that situation, persons wouldn’t persist 
at all?unless they are metaphysical simples (a view defended by for 
example David Barnett (2013)). Let’s suppose that the correct 
replacement for unrestricted mereological composition is such that it does 
allow persons to persist. But what grounds the fact that some particular 
person, Sally, continues to exist? 
My answer, recall, is that all collections of temporal parts exist, and 
one of them is picked out as morally significant, and is identified as the 
persisting person. But the endurance theorist has to say that it’s a 
metaphysical fact of the matter that a particular thing, Sally, continues to 
exist. It’s unclear to me what (if anything) grounds those metaphysical 
facts. If nothing grounds those metaphysical facts, how do we have 
epistemic access to them? (We arguably have epistemic access to the 
moral facts via our faculty of rational intuition?do we have access to the 
ungrounded metaphysical facts about endurance via similar means?) And 
if something does ground those metaphysical facts about endurance, what 
is the ground? The endurance theorist is welcome to take on board my 
answer, that the moral facts are the ground. But if the endurance theorist 
does not make that move, then I find it mysterious what (if anything) is 
the ground for these metaphysical facts about whether a person continues 
to be wholly present, and how we could have access to these 
metaphysical facts.
Some endurance theorists argue that there is no interesting debate about 
personal identity to be had once one assumes the truth of the perdurance 
theory and unrestricted mereological composition. Eric Olson, for 
example, holds that “if material objects are temporally extended, then 
there are no substantive metaphysical problems about our identity through 
time, but only semantic questions about how the language of personal 
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identity works” (Olson 1997, 5). (Later in his book, Olson says that 
another assumption is needed to get his conclusion that personal identity 
questions become semantic questions; this assumption is something like 
the assumption of unrestricted mereological composition: “that every 
matter-filled region of spacetime contains an object” with the extension 
of that region (Olson 1997, 162).) 
Let’s consider Olson’s claim that, given my perdurance and unrestricted 
mereological composition assumptions, personal identity questions are 
just semantic questions. Olson’s thought is that, if all the mereological 
sums of temporal parts are real, then it’s just a semantic question of 
which ones count as being the referent of our concept ‘person’. But what 
Olson is missing is that the objective moral facts can be brought in to 
ground our ascriptions of which mereological sums count as persisting 
people. It’s true that there’s a residual semantic question, but that holds 
for all metaphysics. If we redefine “God” as “love”, then I’m no longer 
an atheist, because I believe in love. But the concept of God is a 
metaphysically important concept, as is the concept of a person. Because 
the concept is metaphysically important, then picking out which entities 
count as persisting people is metaphysically important; it’s not just a 
semantic issue. And my key point is that one can hold that the concept 
of a person is metaphysically important even if one endorses the 
perdurance theory and unrestricted mereological composition, by 
recognizing the connection between personhood and the objective moral 
truths. (If moral anti-realism is true, then while the connection between 
personhood and morality is still there, the concept of a person is 
presumably less metaphysically important, because morality itself doesn’t 
have an objective metaphysical status.)
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??? ????? ??????????
I’ll close out this paper by considering four objections to my argument. 
????????????????????????????????????????
Some philosophers hold that a (human) fetus is a person. But fetuses 
aren’t morally responsible (setting implausible claims about original sin 
aside). Hence, a fetus is a persisting person without having moral 
responsibility relations between its temporal parts, and hence, my view of 
persistence of persons is false.
It’s true that my theory of metaidentity is incompatible with some other 
views about what counts as a person and who is morally responsible. But 
that is not problematic, because those other views are false. A fetus is not 
a person, nor are recently born infants. Providing an argument for this is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but briefly, my reason is as follows: a 
fetus is not cognitively sophisticated enough to be morally responsible for 
its actions, and hence is not a person. But I’d also be happy to follow 
for example Tooley’s reasoning: a fetus is not a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states that can envisage a future for itself 
and that can have desires about its own future states, and hence a fetus 
is not a person. Assuming that Tooley’s account of personhood is correct, 
then once an entity becomes a continuing subject of experiences and 
other mental states that can envision a future for itself and that can have 
desires about its own future states, it follows (by my lights) that this 
entity is morally responsible for its actions (in at least a rudimentary 
way), and hence it follows that it is a person. 
Note that it does not follow from what I’ve said that abortion or 
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infanticide is morally permissible. Just as we have a prima facie moral 
obligation not to kill cats, even though cats are not people, so we may 
have a prima facie moral obligation not to kill non-person humans. 
Given that fetuses are not persons, and older children are, how does the 
transition happen? Is it an all-at-once shift, or are there degrees of 
personhood? My view is as follows: if the agent goes from being not 
morally responsible to morally responsible (even if morally responsible 
just to a small degree), then that’s enough for the agent to go from being 
a non-person to a person. But if there is somehow proto-moral 
responsibility (where it’s not the case that the agent is simply not morally 
responsible, but it’s not the case that the agent is definitely morally 
responsible), then there would be intermediate degrees of personhood as 
well, corresponding to these proto-moral responsibility states.
???? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????? ???????????? ????? ??????
??????????????
Some might argue that a person can persist through time, even if there 
are no moral responsibility relations that hold between the temporal parts 
of the person over that time interval. Consider a person, Ally, who is by 
herself, on a desert island, and will continue to be by herself for the rest 
of her life. This is a special island such that it (and the surrounding 
waters) contain no sentient creatures other than her. These objectors could 
maintain Ally can’t do anything morally wrong or right, because there are 
no sentient creatures for her to do those morally wrong or right actions 
towards. Ally is morally neutral, and yet we all agree that she continues 
to persist as a person. These objectors would conclude that personhood 
is more fundamental than moral responsibility.
I’ll present five possible ways of replying to this objection. First, 
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theists could hold that Ally is always in a relationship with God, and 
hence can always do morally wrong or right by God. Second, one could 
hold that Ally can still harm herself, and that in itself is morally wrong. 
(Similarly, Ally can refrain from harming herself, and that is morally 
commendable.) Third, one could endorse something like virtue ethics, 
which holds that Ally’s developing a good moral character is itself 
morally commendable, even if there is no one (other than Ally) to benefit 
from her having that good moral character. So, if a temporal part of Ally 
cultivates the desire to commit genocide, then the genocide-desiring 
immediately subsequent temporal parts of Ally are morally responsible 
for having cultivated that desire. Similarly, if a temporal part of Ally 
refrains from cultivating that desire, then the immediately subsequent 
temporal parts are morally commendable for having refrained. This 
establishes the appropriate chain of moral responsibility and 
commendability relations, and that grounds Ally’s persistence as a person 
through time. 
The second and third answers are my favorites, but if you don’t like 
them, here are two more. One could appeal to counterfactuals: Ally 
persists because, had other people been around, she would have behaved 
in a morally accountable way toward them. Or, one could appeal to 
capacities: Ally persists because she has the capacity for being morally 
responsible. By my lights, those last two options bring in too much 
metaphysical baggage, but if you’re not happy with the other answers, 
feel free to consider taking on the baggage.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
Some might argue that a person can’t be morally responsible for anything 
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while she is asleep, but she clearly does persist as a person while she is 
asleep. Thus, my grounding of personal identity in morality fails. 
The objector here is forgetting that one can be morally responsible not 
just for actions, but also for omissions. Omissions are key for the sleep 
situation. Bob is currently asleep, but he could have woken up just before 
now and done a morally wrong act; Bob is morally commendable for 
omitting to wake up and do something morally wrong. 
But what about comas? Can Bob persist as a person through a coma? 
I hold that, if Bob is in a coma, Bob is not morally commendable for 
omitting to wake up, since he is incapable of doing so. Thus, when Bob 
is in a coma, he continues to exist as a human organism, but not as a 
person. 
Suppose that Bob’s coma is temporary, and he eventually recovers 
from it. After the coma, Bob continues to exist as a person. Should we 
be bothered by Bob’s discontinuous existence here? I will argue that we 
shouldn’t, for two reasons. 
First, we have some continuity, because Bob continues to exist as a 
human organism throughout the coma, even though Bob as a person goes 
out of existence and later comes back into existence. (The referent of 
“Bob” changes depending on context?sometimes it refers to the person, 
sometimes it refers to the human organism, sometimes it refers to 
stardust.)
Second, metaphysicians are already familiar with discontinuous 
existence, when for example a person enters a time machine in the year 
2015 and instantaneously (from the standpoint of her personal time) and 
discontinuously appears in 1815. Of course, time travel is controversial, 
but the arguments that are used to justify the continued existence of a 
person over a discontinuous time travel jump are good arguments, and 
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can carry over to justify the continued existence of Bob as a person. 
(Such arguments are given by for example David Lewis (1976a).)
For the final case where a person arguably continues to exist without 
being morally responsible, consider brainwashing. Suppose Sally is given 
a drug that gives her the desire to kill Fred?Sally is a person, but is 
arguably not morally responsible for killing Fred. Does this mean that 
Sally persists as a person without being morally responsible? No, because 
while Sally is brainwashed to kill Fred, Sally isn’t brainwashed to (say) 
omit from kicking John. So when Sally does omit from kicking John, 
she’s morally commendable for that action (even though she’s 
brainwashed). It’s only if the brainwashing controlled all of Sally’s 
actions (and omissions) that she wouldn’t be morally responsible?and if 
Sally is under that sort of complete control, then, indeed, she is no longer 
a person.
?????????????????????????????????????
So far, I’ve talked about personal identity thought-experiments as if they 
involve a temporal part of a person pre-experiment, and a temporal part 
of a person post-experiment, and we simply have to figure out whether 
those are temporal parts of the same person. But what about fission? Call 
“old Katie” the temporal part of a person that enters the fission machine, 
and “Katie1” and “Katie2” the temporal parts that emerge. How can my 
grounding of personal identity in terms of moral responsibility make 
sense of this scenario? 
My answer is: unproblematically. Suppose first that the objective moral 
facts are such that Katie1 and Katie2 are not morally responsible for 
anything old Katie did. It would follow, based on my metaidentity theory, 
that the person which included the old Katie temporal part has ceased to 
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exist, and two new people have come into existence, with qualitative 
similarities to the person who ceased to exist. 
Now suppose that the objective moral facts are such that Katie1 and 
Katie2 are morally responsible for something that old Katie did. It 
follows, by my analysis, that Katie1 and Katie2 are parts of the same 
person as old Katie. How can one make sense of this? On the perdurance 
theory of persistence, at least, this is unproblematic, as Lewis (1976b) has 
shown. There is a persisting person that the temporal parts old Katie and 
Katie1 are a part of, and there is a different persisting person that the 
temporal parts old Katie and Katie2 are a part of. The four-dimensional 
spacetime worms of these persisting people overlap, sharing some 
temporal parts in common. 
But what if (as many believe) proponents of the endurance theory 
cannot make sense of a person persisting through fission? If the objective 
moral facts are such that Katie1 and Katie2 are both morally responsible 
for something that old Katie did, then by my lights it follows that Katie 
did persist through fission, and hence the endurance theory is false. In 
this way, we can look to morality not simply to provide answers to 
questions about personal identity, but to provide answers to other 
perennial questions in metaphysics too.1)
1) For helpful comments, thanks to anonymous reviewers for this journal, and 
audiences at University of Sydney, the 2012 Australasian Association of 
Philosophy conference in Wellington, and University of Colorado Boulder. Also 
thanks to Rebecca Chan, Matti Eklund, Nicole Hassoun, Ryan Jenkins, Brian 
Kierland, David Kovacs, Kristie Miller, Chad Mohler, Denis Robinson, and 
David Shoemaker.
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